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Abstract
Rental Harmony is the problem of assigning rooms in a rented house to tenants
with different preferences, and simultaneously splitting the rent among them, such that
no tenant envies the bundle (room+price) given to another tenant. Different papers
have studied this problem under two incompatible assumptions: the miserly tenants
assumption is that each tenant prefers a free room to a non-free room; the quasilinear
tenants assumption is that each tenant attributes a monetary value to each room, and
prefers a room of which the difference between value and price is maximum. This note
shows how to adapt the main technique used for rental harmony with miserly tenants,
using Sperner’s lemma, to a much more general class of preferences, that contains both
miserly and quasilinear tenants as special cases. This implies that some recent results
derived for miserly tenants apply to this more general preference class too.
Keywords: Envy-free; Assignment problem; Rental harmony; Sperner’s Lemma
1 The Problem
There is a set N of agents who rent a house together. The set of rooms in the house is M,
with |N | = |M| = n. The total rent is R. It is required to assign a price pj ∈ R to each
room j ∈ M such that the sum of all prices is R, and assign each room in M to a unique
agent in N . The agents have different preferences on the rooms. The preferences of an agent
are represented by a demand function — for each price-vector p ∈ Rn, the agent has a set
of one or more rooms that he/she considers the best rooms given the prices. An allocation
in which each agent receives a room from the set of his/her best rooms is called envy-free.
The existence of envy-free allocations has been proved using various techniques and under
various assumptions on the agents’ preferences. Gale (1960) made the following assumption:
Quasilinear Tenants Assumption: For all i ∈ N and j ∈M, there is a value
vi,j representing the value for agent i of room j. The best rooms of agent i in
price p are the ones maximizing the difference vi,j − pj.
Gale proved the existence of envy-free allocations using linear programming duality. Later
works provided fast algorithms for calculating an envy-free allocation with quasilinear tenants
using various techniques: a compensation procedure (Haake et al., 2002), a market-based
mechanism (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2004), maximum matching and linear programming (Sung
and Vlach, 2004). The latter approach has been later implemented and tested in the popular
website spliddit.org (Gal et al., 2017).
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Figure 1: Two labelings of a triangulation of a 3-simplex. Left: the labeling satisfies the
conditions to Sperner’s lemma. Right: the labeling satisfies the conditions to Scarf’s lemma.
In both cases, * denotes a fully-labeled simplex (there may be more than one).
Su (1999), who invented the term “rental harmony”, made a different assumption — an
agent always prefers a free room if one is available. Su considered only non-negative prices;
since we will want to consider general prices, we present a slightly generalized version of his
assumption — an agent always prefers a room with a non-positive price if one is available:
Miserly Tenants Assumption: Given a price-vector p in which pj ≤ 0 for
some j ∈M, every agent has a best room j∗ with pj∗ ≤ 0.
In addition, Su assumed that the demand functions are continuous in the following sense: if
some room j is a best room for agent i for a convergent sequence of price-vectors, then j is
a best room for i in the limit price-vector.
Miserly tenants, in general, do not satisfy the quasilinear assumption. The miserly ten-
ants model puts no restrictions on the preferences when all prices are strictly positive. The
preferences may even depend on the entire price-vector. For example, the miserly tenants
model allows an agent to prefer the first room when the price-vector is (100, 200, 200, 300)
and prefer the second room when the price-vector is (100, 200, 400, 100), even though the
prices of both rooms have not changed. Azrieli and Shmaya (2014) describe several situ-
ations in which such preferences may be reasonable. For example, the agent may believe
that a room with a rent as high as 400 attracts wealthy neighbors and that this makes the
neighboring room more attractive. As another example, if the second and third room are
similar in quality, the fact that the third room costs 400 might make the second room look
more attractive — a well-known behavioral bias. In any case, attaining rental harmony with
miserly tenants requires a different technique, which is described next.
2 Sperner-type Lemmas
Sperner’s lemma and its variants consider an n-vertex simplex, which w.l.o.g. is the standard
n-simplex ∆n−1 = {(x1, . . . , xn)|
∑n
j=1 xj = 1,∀j ∈ [n] : xj ≥ 0}. For each i ∈ [n], we denote
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by Fi the main vertex of the simplex in which the i-th coordinate is 1 and all other coordinates
are 0.
The simplex is triangulated, and each vertex of the triangulation is labeled with a label in
{1, . . . , n}. The goal of all Sperner-type lemmas is to identify conditions that guarantee the
existence of a fully-labeled sub-simplex — a sub-simplex of the triangulation whose vertices
are labeled with n different labels.
We say that a labeling satisfies Sperner’s boundary condition if the label on each vertex
(x1, . . . , xn) is some j for which xj > 0. In particular, the label of F1 is 1; the label of each
vertex on the line between F1 and F2 is either 1 or 2; and so on. Sperner’s lemma says that
every labeling that satisfies Sperner’s boundary condition admits a fully-labeled simplex. An
example is shown in Figure 1/Left.
Sperner’s lemma has many variants; of particular interest here is the variant proved by
Scarf (1982). We say that a labeling satisfies Scarf ’s boundary condition if the label on each
vertex (x1, . . . , xn) is some j for which xj = 0. In particular, when n = 3, the label of F1
is either 2 or 3; the label of all vertices in the interior of the line between F1 and F2 is 3;
and so on. Scarf’s lemma says that, in any sufficiently-fine triangulation (specifically, in any
triangulation in which no sub-simplex touches all n faces of the large simplex), every labeling
that satisfies Scarf ’s boundary condition admits a fully-labeled simplex. An example is shown
in Figure 1/Right.
3 Miserly Tenants and Scarf’s Lemma
Su’s proof of rental harmony with miserly tenants has two components. First, associate each
vertex of the triangulation to one of the n agents, such that in each sub-simplex, all n agents
are represented (this is easy to do with the triangulations illustrated in Figure 1). Then,
associate each point x in ∆n−1 with a price-vector p such that, for all j ∈M,
pj = R · xj. (1)
Each vertex of the triangulation is labeled with the index of one of the “best rooms” of the
agent who owns that vertex, in the price associated with that vertex.
Each vertex on the boundary of ∆n−1 corresponds to a price-vector in which one or more
rooms are free. Then, the Miserly Tenants assumption implies that for each agent there
is a best room j ∈ M for which xj = 0. Thus, it is possible to label each vertex of the
triangulation such that the labeling satisfies Scarf’s boundary condition. By Scarf’s lemma,
there is a fully-labeled simplex. Consider a sequence of finer and finer triangulations. The
sequence of fully-labeled simplices has a subsequence that converges to a point. At the limit
point, by the continuity of the preferences, each agent has a different best room. Hence there
is an envy-free allocation with prices determined by the coordinates of the limit point.
Su’s theorem has been extended in various ways:
1. Azrieli and Shmaya (2014) considered rental harmony with roommates, when each room
can accommodate several tenants;
2. Frick et al. (2019); Asada et al. (2018) considered rental harmony with a secretive
agent, when only n− 1 agents are present, and they have to determine a price-vector
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such that, when the n-th agent comes and picks a room he prefers, the other n − 1
agents can allocate the remaining n− 1 rooms among them in an envy-free way.
3. Meunier and Su (2019) considered rental harmony with an extra agent, when n + 1
agents are present, and they have to determine a price-vector such that, when any
agent leaves, the remaining n agents can allocate the n rooms among them in an
envy-free way.
4. Nyman et al. (2020) considered multi-house rental harmony, when there are several
n-room houses (say, a bedroom house and an office building that are being rented to
a set of agents together), and each agent should receive a room in each house.
All these extensions use appropriate generalizations of Scarf’s lemma, and they all make an
assumption similar to the Miserly Tenants assumption.
Quasilinear tenants do not satisfy the Miserly Tenants assumption. For example, consider
a house with total rent R = 1000 and three rooms: a spacious living-room and two basements.
Consider a quasilinear tenant who values the living-room at 800 and each basement at 100.
If the price-vector is (600, 400, 0), then the quasilinear tenant (quite understandably) strictly
prefers the living-room to both basements. To further illustrate the difficulty with the miserly
tenants assumption, note that this assumption combined with the continuity of the demand
function implies that every agent is indifferent between all free rooms (Frick et al., 2019),
which is clearly unrealistic.
Su (1999) notes, in the “Comments and Discussion” section, that his proof can be adapted
to use a weaker assumption: whenever a free room is available, each agent has a best room
that is not the most expensive room. Formally:
Weak Miserly Tenants Assumption: Given a price-vector p in which pj ≤ 0
for some j ∈M, every agent has a best room j∗ with pj∗ < maxj pj.
The above example shows that quasilinear tenants do not satisfy even this weaker assump-
tion: the quasilinear agent prefers the living room although it is the most expensive one.
This raises the question of whether or not the above extensions are valid for quasilinear
tenants. The next section answers this question in the affirmative, by describing a new proof
to the existence of rental harmony with quasilinear tenants — a proof using Sperner’s lemma.
4 Quasilinear Tenants and Sperner’s Lemma
To handle quasilinear tenants, we just need to change the interpretation of the points in the
n-simplex: Associate each point x in ∆n−1 with a price-vector p such that, for all j ∈M,
pj = 1/xj. (2)
Then, the boundary points correspond to price-vectors in which some rooms cost infinity.
This means that each price is an element of the (positive) extended real number line R+ ∪
{∞}, rather than an element of R+. Note that, since
∑n
j=1 xj = 1 and ∀j : xj ≥ 0, all prices
are positive and at least one price is finite.
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As in Su’s proof, each vertex of the triangulation is labeled with a best room of the
vertex owner. A quasilinear agent always prefers a room with a finite price to a room with
an infinite price. Hence, the labeling satisfies Sperner’s boundary condition: the label on
a boundary vertex is always the index of room j for which xj > 0. By Sperner’s lemma,
the labeling admits a fully-labeled sub-simplex. Continuity of preferences is preserved too.
Hence there exist an envy-free allocation with some price-vector p.
One problem remains: the sum of prices in p may be unequal to R. However, with
quasilinear agents this is easy to solve. First, note that all prices in p are finite — otherwise
no allocation would have been envy-free. Let S :=
∑n
j=1 pj. Let q be a new price-vector
defined by: qj := pj +(R−S)/n. For a quasilinear agent, adding a fixed amount to the price
of each room does not change the relative preference-ordering between the rooms. Hence,
the same allocation is envy-free with price-vector q, and the sum of prices is S+(R−S) = R.
Note that adding (R − S)/n to all prices might make some prices negative. This means
that some tenants are paid to live in their room.1 This is inevitable: in some situations with
quasilinear tenants, all envy-free allocations have negative prices. For example, suppose
n = 2, tenant 1 values the bedroom at 150 and the basement at 0, tenant 2 values the
bedroom at 140 and the basement at 10, and R = 100. Then in any envy-free allocation
tenant 1 gets the bedroom and tenant 2 gets the basement, and to avoid envy the difference
in prices must be at least 130. Since the sum of prices is 100, the price of the basement must
be at most −15.2
5 Non-linear Tenants
Svensson (1983) and Alkan et al. (1991) generalized the quasilinear tenants model by as-
suming that each agent i has a transitive preference-relation i on (room,price) pairs. For
each price-vector p, the best rooms of agent i are the rooms j for which the pairs (j, pj) are
maximal (by i). They assume that the preference-relation is continuous and monotonic in
the price, i.e., (j, p) i (j, p+ δ) whenever δ ≥ 0. Without further assumptions, an envy-free
allocation might not exist. For example, if (1, p) i (2, q) for all agents i and prices p, q, then
the agent who receives room 2 always envies the agent who receives room 1. Therefore they
make assumptions whose thrust is that every agent can be convinced to select any room, if
its price is sufficiently low relative to the other rooms. The following assumption is made by
Svensson (1983) before Theorem 1, and by Alkan et al. (1991) at their Theorem 2 proof.3
Archimedean Tenants assumption: There exists a number T ≥ R such that
an agent always prefers a free room to a room that costs T . Formally, for any
agent i and any two rooms j, j′: (j, 0) i (j′, T ).
1 Negative prices may make sense in some situations. For example, if one of the rooms requires constant
maintenance in order to prevent nuisances to the other rooms, then the tenants might agree to pay anyone
who will take this room and do the maintenance job.
2 Brams and Kilgour (2001) show an example with n = 4 agents and rooms, in which for each agent, the
sum of values of all rooms equals R, and still there are negative prices in any envy-free allocation.
3 The term “Archimedean” was invented by Rodrigo Velez. A similar assumption, called “Assumption
A1”, is presented in a recent survey paper by Velez (2018).
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Note that, if the assumption is satisfied with some T , that it is satisfied with any T ′ > T by
the price-monotonicity. Therefore, the assumption T ≥ R is without loss of generality.
The Archimedean Tenants assumption is more general than the Quasilinear Tenants as-
sumption: every quasilinear tenant is Archimedean with any T ≥ maxi∈N (maxj vi,j −minj vi,j) =
the largest value-difference between two rooms. In particular, if the tenant assigns a non-
negative value to each room, and the sum of all values is R, then T = R will do.
However, it is still not sufficiently general to handle Miserly Tenants. For example, the
tenant in the example at the end of Section 1 cannot be represented by a preference-relation
on room-rent pairs, since the preference between the first two rooms depends on the rents
of the other rooms.
To handle such externalities in the preferences, Velez (2016) presents the compensation
assumption (Definition 2). The following is a slightly simplified version of his assumption,
adapted to the language of rooms and rent.
Compensable Tenants assumption: There exists T ≥ R such that, if there
is a room which costs at most 0 and the most expensive room costs T , then each
agent prefers a room that costs less than T . Formally, given a price-vector p in
which minj pj ≤ 0 and maxj pj = T , every agent has a best room j∗ with pj∗ < T .
The Compensable Tenants assumption is more general than all previous assumptions:
• Every Archimedean tenant (with some T ) is compensable with the same T . Suppose
pj ≤ 0 for some j ∈ M, and pj′ = T for the most expensive room j′ ∈ M. Every
agent weakly prefers (j, pj) to (j, 0) by price-monotonicity and (j, 0) to (j
′, T ) by the
Archimedean assumption. Hence each agent has a best room which costs less than T .
• Every (weakly) miserly tenant is compensable with any T > 0. Again suppose pj ≤ 0
for some j ∈M, and pj′ = T for the most expensive room j′ ∈M. By the weak miserly
tenants assumption, every agent has a best room which is not the most expensive, so
it costs less than T .
Fortunately, even this most general case can be handled by Sperner’s lemma: all that is
needed is a different interpretation of the points in the n-simplex.
Theorem 1. An envy-free allocation among compensable tenants always exists.
Proof. Associate each point x in ∆n−1 with a price-vector p such that, for all j ∈M,
pj = T − (Tn−R)xj. (3)
In particular, when T = R this gives pj = R · (1 − (n − 1)x). Note that
∑
j∈M pj =
Tn− (Tn−R) = R. If xj′ = 0 for some j ∈M, then pj′ = T . Moreover, when xj′ = 0, there
is at least one other room j for which xj ≥ 1/(n−1), which implies pj ≤ (R−T )/(n−1) ≤ 0
(here the assumption T ≥ R is used).
The Compensable Tenants assumption then implies that for each agent there is a best
room j∗ ∈M for which pj∗ < T , which implies xj∗ > 0. Hence, the agents’ labelings satisfy
Sperner’s boundary condition and an envy-free allocation exists.
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Remark. In general, the prices in the envy-free allocation of Theorem 1 might be negative.
As said in Section 4, this may be inevitable since the theorem covers quasilinear tenants.
However, if all tenants are miserly (in addition to being compensable), then the prices in
any envy-free allocation must be non-negative, since otherwise the miserly tenant who gets
the most expensive room envies the tenant who gets the room with the negative price.
Thus, the proof combines advantages of previous proofs: it works both with and without
the miserly tenants assumption, and with this assumption it guarantees non-negative prices.
The proof of rental harmony existence using Sperner’s lemma has two advantages over
previous proofs regarding quasilinear agents.
First, it is arguably simpler. Due to the discrete nature of Sperner’s lemma, and thanks
to the beautiful and simple proofs available for it (Su, 1999), it is easily understood even by
students with little background in mathematics.4
Second, the new proof enables to extend the results on rental harmony existence in all
settings listed in Section 3 (roommates, secretive agents, extra agents or multiple houses)
from miserly tenants to compensable tenants. In particular, all these results hold for quasi-
linear tenants. These existence results, as far as we know, were not known before. The
following section presents these results briefly.
6 Extensions
We will use a generalization of Sperner’s lemma, which was proved recently by Meunier
and Su (2019). It considers a triangulation of the standard simplex ∆m−1, which is labeled
with labels from the set {1, . . . ,m} by n different agents. For each sub-simplex σ of the
triangulation, denote by G(σ) the bipartite graph with the n agents on one side, the m
labels on the other side, and there is an edge between an agent and a label iff the agent uses
that label anywhere on that simplex.
Let G(σ) be the bipartite graph, and let w be a function that assigns a non-negative
weight to each edge of G(σ), such that the sum of all weights is 1. For each agent i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, let b(σ,w)i be the sum of weights of the edges adjacent to i in G(σ). Similarly,
for each label j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let a(σ,w)j be the sum of weights of the edges adjacent to j
in G(σ). Note that the vector b(σ,w) is a point in ∆n−1 and the vector a(σ,w) is a point in
∆m−1. An illustration is shown in Figure 2 (left).
The following is proved by Meunier and Su (2019) as a crucial step before the proof of
their Theorem 2.3.2.
Lemma 2 (Meunier and Su (2019)). Let a0 be an arbitrary vector in ∆
m−1 and b0 an
arbitrary vector in ∆n−1. If n agents label the vertices of a triangulation of ∆m−1 by labels
from {1, . . . ,m}, and all labelings satisfy Sperner’s boundary condition, then there exists a
sub-simplex σ and a weight-function w on G(σ) such that
b(σ,w) = b0 a(σ,w) = a0.
4 This observation is based on the author’s experience teaching fair division to computer programmers.
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Figure 2: Left: A possible bipartite graph G(σ) in a setting with n = 3 agents and
m = 2 labels. This graph corresponds to a sub-simplex σ ∈ ∆2−1 in which agent 1 labels
both vertices by 1, agent 2 labels one vertex by 1 and one vertex by 2, and agent 3 labels
both vertices by 2. The weights on the edges show a possible weight-function w. Here
b(σ,w) = [0.1, 0.5, 0.4] and a(σ,w) = [0.3, 0.7].
Right: A possible bipartite graph G(p) in which a(w,p) = b(w,p) = (1/n, . . . , 1/n).
We will apply this lemma to labelings generated as in Theorem 1, with n agents and
m rooms. Each agent i labels each vertex x with the index of a best room of i given the
price-vector p calculated from x by equation (3). As explained in the proof of Theorem 1,
all these labelings satisfy Sperner’s boundary condition. For each price-vector p ∈ Rm, let
G(p) be the bipartite graph defined like G(σ) above: the vertices are the n agents and the m
rooms, and each agent is adjacent to all his best room/s given the price p. By the standard
continuity argument, we get the following corollary of Lemma 2.
Corollary 3. Suppose there are m rooms and n compensable agents. Let a0 be an arbitrary
vector in ∆m−1 and b0 be an arbitrary vector in ∆n−1. There exists a price-vector p ∈ Rm
and a weight-function w on Gp such that
b(p, w) = b0 a(p, w) = a0.
To illustrate the usefulness of Corollary 3, let us use it to re-prove the existence of an
envy-free room allocation in the standard setting in which m = n. Apply Corollary 3 with
a0 = b0 = (1/n, . . . , 1/n). It implies the existence of a price-vector p and a weight function
w on G(p), which look as in Figure 2 (right). All weights are weakly-positive, and the sum
of weights near each vertex is 1/n. This implies that each agent is adjacent to at least one
room; every two agents are adjacent together to at least two rooms; and so on. In general, for
each subset of k agents, the total weight near their vertices is k/n, so they must be adjacent
to at least k different rooms. This means that the graph G(p) satisfies the conditions to
Hall’s marriage theorem (Hall, 1935). Hence, there exists a perfect matching of agents to
rooms, where each agent is matched to one of his/her best rooms given p.
Next, consider the problem of rental harmony with roommates. There are |M| = m
rooms with m ≤ n, and each room j ∈M has a fixed capacity cj, where
∑
j∈M cj = n. The
goal is to assign to each room j a subset cj of tenants and a price pj (which is shared equally
among the cj tenants) such that no tenant is envious. Azrieli and Shmaya (2014) proved
the existence of an envy-free allocation assuming all tenants are miserly. Later, Ghodsi
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et al. (2018) proved the same assuming all tenants are quasilinear.5 The following theorem
generalizes both results.
Theorem 4. When all agents are compensable, an envy-free allocation with roommates
exists.
Proof. Apply Corollary 3 with b0 = (1/n, . . . , 1/n) and a0 = (c1/n, . . . , cm/n). It implies the
existence of a price-vector p such that, in the bipartite graph G(p), each room j is adjacent
to at least cj agents. Moreover, every two rooms j1, j2 are adjacent to at least cj1 +cj2 agents,
and so on. By a straightforward generalization of Hall’s marriage theorem (see Azrieli and
Shmaya (2014), Theorem 3 in Appendix B), the graph G(p) admits a one-to-many matching
in which each room j is matched to exactly cj agents. This corresponds to an envy-free room
allocation with roommates.
Next, consider the problem of rental harmony with a secretive agent. There are n ≥ 2
rooms and n agents, but only n−1 agents are present. They need to decide on a price-vector
p ∈ Rn such that, when the n-th agent comes and picks a room, the remaining agents can
allocate the remaining rooms among them (without changing the prices) such that there
is no envy. Asada et al. (2018) and Frick et al. (2019) proved that this is possible with
miserly tenants. The paper of Velez (2016) implies a slightly weaker result for compensable
tenants: an envy-free allocation exists even when only n − 1 agents are compensable (but
the preferences of the n-th agent must still be known). The following theorem generalizes
both results.
Theorem 5. When at least n − 1 agents are compensable, an envy-free allocation can be
found even before the preferences of the n-th agent are known.
Proof. Apply Corollary 3 with the n − 1 present agents and the n rooms. Let b0 =
( 1
n−1 , . . . ,
1
n−1) and a0 = (
1
n
, . . . , 1
n
). It implies the existence of a price-vector p and a weight-
function on the bipartite graph G(p), such that the sum of weights near each present agent
is 1
n−1 , and the sum of weights near each room is
1
n
. Suppose that the n-th agent now
comes and picks a room. There are n− 1 remaining rooms. The weight near each subset of
k ≤ n−1 rooms is at least k
n
. This fraction is larger than k−1
n−1 , so every k rooms are adjacent
together to more than k − 1 agents, which means at least k agents. Hence, the remaining
graph satisfies Hall’s marriage condition, and there is a perfect matching between the n− 1
agents and the n− 1 remaining rooms.
Remark. Frick et al. (2019) asked whether there always exists an envy-free allocation with
both roommates and a secretive agent. The answer is yes, and it can be proved by combining
the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5.
5 They used a reduction to the standard setting: For each room j, construct cj sub-rooms with capacity
1, and let each agent value all sub-rooms of room j by vj . Note that this reduction cannot be used for miserly
tenants, since it does not preserve the Miserly Tenants assumption. For example, suppose the living-room
has capacity 2 and the basement has capacity 1. Suppose the two sub-rooms of the living-room are priced
at 0 and 200 and the basement is priced at 200. Then, the living-room and the basement have the same
positive price, so a tenant who prefers the basement satisfies the Miserly Tenants assumption in the original
problem, but not in the reduced problem.
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Next, consider the problem of rental harmony with an extra agent. There are n rooms
and n + 1 agents. They need to decide on a price-vector p ∈ Rn such that, when any
agent leaves, the remaining agents can allocate the rooms among them (without changing
the prices) such that there is no envy.
Theorem 6. When all agents are compensable, an envy-free allocation with an extra agent
exists.
Proof. The proof is very similar to Theorem 5. Apply Corollary 3 with the n+ 1 agents and
the n rooms. Let b0 = (1/(n + 1), . . . , 1/(n + 1)) and a0 = (1/n, . . . , 1/n). It implies the
existence of a price-vector p and a weight-function on the bipartite graph G(p), such that
the sum of weights near each agent is 1/(n + 1), and the sum of weights near each room is
1/n. Suppose that agent i leaves. Remove from G(p) the vertex representing i and all its
adjacent edges. In the remaining graph, the weight near each subset of k rooms is at least
k/n − 1/(n + 1) > (k − 1)/(n + 1), so every k rooms are adjacent together to at least k
remaining agents. Hence, the remaining graph satisfies Hall’s marriage condition, and there
is a perfect matching between the n remaining agents and the n rooms.
7 Future Work
The new existence results proved above open up some interesting computational issues.
With quasilinear tenants, there are fast algorithms for computing an envy-free allocation
(see Section 1). Can these algorithms handle more advanced settings such as roommates,
secretive agents or extra agents? Can these algorithms be extended to compensable tenants?
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